Despite
their obvious unfairness, tax amnesties are a tool frequently used by
states during tough budgetary times. By waiving late fees and
sometimes reducing the interest rate charged on overdue taxes, state
policymakers can provide their state with a quick band-aid fix without
having to make the much harder choice of raising taxes or cutting
valued services. But penalizing similar taxpayers at different rates
dependent only upon whether they decide to pay up during an amnesty
period is plainly unfair. The problems associated with amnesties
become even worse, however, as soon as a state establishes a habit of
repeatedly offering amnesties during tough economic times.
With
the possibility of another amnesty always on the horizon, delinquent
taxpayers will think twice before settling their debts with the state
during normal times, and at normal penalty rates. Creating multiple
sets of penalties (one for normal times, and one, lower penalty when
budgets shortfalls are projected) therefore reduces fairness by
penalizing similar taxpayers differently based only on the timing of
their payment, and can also reduce the effectiveness of enforcement
efforts and the tax system broadly. These effects can continue long
after the most recent amnesty period ends. (Note that this is very
similar to the argument against
allowing corporations to "repatriate" their profits to the U.S. at a
lower rate, a proposal which was recently rejected at the federal
level).
Despite the obvious problems, Maryland and New Mexico
are both considering legislation to once again provide temporary tax
amnesty programs some time in the coming months. New Mexico last
provided an amnesty less than a decade ago, while Maryland's last
amnesty came in 2001. After that 2001 amnesty, the Maryland
comptroller's office noted that "repeated use of amnesties is likely to
create cynicism among law-abiding taxpayers, and lessen the need for
voluntary compliance with state tax laws, which is vital for our system
of taxation". Should another amnesty be offered less than a decade
after the 2001 amnesty, growth in taxpayer cynicism seems unavoidable,
especially in light of the fact that a similar program offered in 1987
in the state was billed as a "once-in-a-lifetime" opportunity for delinquent payers.
Without a doubt, the momentum in favor of such programs is strong. Alabama is already in the mist of an amnesty period (the state last offered an amnesty in 1984). Massachusetts is currently in the process
of deciding upon a date for its amnesty program (Massachusetts last
provided amnesty in 2003). Connecticut's program is already slated to take effect on May 1st (Connecticut's last amnesty took place in 2002). And Oklahoma just recently closed its most recent amnesty period, just seven years after its 2002 amnesty.
In this environment, it is extremely important for state policymakers
to not only oppose more amnesties, but also to convincingly state that
another amnesty will not be offered any time in the near future. For
states looking to responsibly close their tax gaps, stepping-up
enforcement spending is often a route that can produce sizeable
returns, and is undoubtedly much more fair than trying to get something
for nothing by arbitrarily waiving penalties in an effort to boost
voluntary "compliance". For more specific alternatives to the tax
amnesty approach, take a look at these recent enforcement recommendations from Oregon's Department of Revenue.